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Abstract 
Infrastructures and generic e-Infrastructures compose an ‘effective’ assurance profile derived from several 
sources, yet it is desirable to exchange the resulting assurance assertion obtained between Infrastructures so 
that it need not be re-computed by a recipient Infrastructure or Infrastructure service provider. This document 
describes the assurance profiles recommended to be used by the Infrastructure AAI Proxies between 
infrastructures: REFEDS RAF Cappuccino and Espresso, IGTF-BIRCH and IGTF-DOGWOOD, and a new 
specific profile addressing assurance partially derived from social-identity sources: AARC-Assam. 
 
Guideline on the exchange of specific assurance 
information between Infrastructures (AARC-G021) 
 
Published 2018-02-13 (Final) 2 
AARC-G021 





Increasingly, Research Infrastructures and generic e-Infrastructures, referred to as 
Infrastructures henceforth, provide collective and ‘meshed’ services where a business 
process is composed of service elements from a variety of Infrastructures yet acts as a 
single coherent service towards the end-user. As part of the user interaction, Infrastructures 
compose an assurance profile derived from several sources. The assurance elements may 
come from an institutional identity provider (IdP), from community-provided information 
sources, from step-up authentication services, and from controls placed upon the user, the 
community, or the Infrastructure Proxy through either policy or technical enforcement. 
Knowledge about the upstream source of either identity or authenticator can also influence 
the risk perception of the Infrastructure and result in a modification of the assurance level, 
e.g. because it has involved a social identity provider or perhaps a government e-ID. The 
granularity of this composite assurance profile is attuned to the risk assessment specific to 
the Infrastructure or Infrastructures, and is often both more fine-grained and more specific 
than what can reasonably be expressed by generic IdPs or consumed by generic service 
providers. 
Yet it is desirable to exchange as complete as possible the assurance assertion obtained 
between Infrastructures, so that assurance elements need not be re-asserted or re-
computed by a recipient Infrastructure or Infrastructure service provider. 
How an Infrastructure determines adherence to an assurance profile beyond the information 
given herein, or how the composition of assurance elements is to be performed is outside 
the scope of this document (it is dealt with in AARC-G031 “Account linking & LoA elevation 
in cross-sector AAIs”) [AARC-G031]. 
 Scope 
These guidelines SHOULD be used when exchanging assurance information between “SP-
IdP-Proxy” components of Infrastructures (Infrastructure Proxies as defined in the Blueprint 
Architecture [BPA]), and MAY be used when conveying assurance information between an 
SP-IdP-Proxy and service providers that are part of a coordinated set or consortium and 
bound to one or more Infrastructure Proxies. 
These guidelines SHOULD NOT be used without further specific agreements to convey 
assurance information between identity providers (such as SAML IdPs or OIDC Providers) 
and Infrastructure Proxies. In such an exchange, incoming assurance information SHOULD 
be requested using the assurance profiles and assurance component values defined in the 
REFEDS Assurance Framework or using the IGTF Assurance Profiles. Which of these is 
appropriate depends on the use case and the technology, and the definition of such context 
is outside the scope of this document. 
These guidelines SHOULD NOT be used to convey assurance information between 
Infrastructure Proxies and service providers that are not part of a coordinated consortium 
that has by itself adopted these guidelines. When assurance information is exchanged 
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between an Infrastructure Proxy and a general service provider, and where the component 
values are a superset of the values required for a REFEDS RAF assurance level, all 
corresponding REFEDS RAF assurance profiles MUST also be asserted. 
This Guideline should be used and interpreted in the context of the AARC Blueprint 
Architecture (https://aarc-project.eu/architecture/) and the AARC Policy recommendations 
(https://aarc-project.eu/policies/). 
 Expression of assurance information 
In line with the REFEDS Assurance Framework (RAF) [RAF], this guideline allows for both a 
composite assurance value and for assurance component values to be expressed. In the 
RAF, it is the component values that play the principle role in expressing assurance 
information, and the composite profiles (“Cappuccino” and “Espresso”, for instance) are the 
result of a specific combination of assurance components that SHOULD be additionally 
asserted by the credential service provider (CSP) [CSP] if they qualify for such a profile. 
While this requirement is of significant benefit to the recipient of assurance information, it 
places some of the burden on the CSP to keep track of the RAF process and change 
operational behaviour if the set of profiles changes. The component values therefore take 
precedence in the RAF specification. 
This is less of a concern between the (limited) number of Infrastructures and Infrastructure 
Proxies. Here the simplicity of exchanging a few well-understood profiles carries significant 
benefit, and allows easier processing of assurance assertions by the participating 
Infrastructures. Therefore, in these guidelines the Profiles take precedence, and Profiles can 
be composed both of assurance components that have been previously standardised (e.g. 
by the RAF or NIST) as well as of other definitions of assurance components (e.g. through 1-
statement policies or references to other documented profiles). 
 Rationale for the additional Profiles 
This document defines one additional profile and imports two additional profiles from the 
IGTF [IGTF]. These profiles can be used as a supplement to - and where required in 
conjunction with -  the RAF Assurance Profiles, and have been added to address some 
issues specific to the Infrastructure use cases 
 the RAF authentication assurance relies on the definition of the REFEDS SFA and 
MFA profiles [SFA, MFA]. Whereas the MFA profile is well understood, the level of 
authentication certainty conveyed with the REFEDS SFA profile follows the minimum 
acceptable basis for the authentication factors of the subset it addresses of NIST 
SP800-63B. While appropriate to permit inclusion of as many R&E Home 
Organisation CSPs as reasonably possible, this is not usually considered sufficient 
for much of the Infrastructure use without specific compensatory controls, which are 
provided in the IGTF-BIRCH profile. 
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 The unique person identifier specification to be determined by the identifier 
components should be specified in accordance with AARC-G026 “Uniquely 
identifying users across infrastructures” [AARC-G026]. 
 Additional vetting can be provided by other sources (e.g. a community authority) to 
raise from incoming “IAP/low” ID proofing assurance identities [IAP] or other ‘lower-
quality’ identities, making it meet the requirements of the IGTF-DOGWOOD profile. If 
an ID Proofing status is a result of additional information provided by identity linking 
in accordance with AARC-G031 “Account linking & LoA elevation in cross-sector 
AAIs” [AARC-G031], or based on data held by the community or the e-Infrastructure, 
this information SHALL be conveyed by adding the “IAP/medium” and/or “IAP/high” 
ID proofing status if it meets the requirements thereof.  
 The attribute freshness requirement needs to take into account composite sources 
(such as Infrastructure registry, community sources, optionally other end-user 
technical and policy controls) as defined in the Section “Attribute freshness 
assurance component”, since the affiliation attribute for identities based on derived 
information or linked identities can no longer accurately reflect a status from an 
upstream identity provider. 
 A mechanism is needed to flag at the Infrastructure Proxy identities that are based on 
social identities, or originate from sources outside the R&E community that are 
otherwise entirely self-managed, in whole or in part. Identity providers of last resort 
that connect to the R&E federation SHOULD qualify and assert “low” ID proofing and 
comply with the REFEDS RAF assurance values. Although in the general case such 
information might be flagged in entity metadata (e.g., using entity categories in 
SAML), within the current conveyance mechanism between Infrastructures, the 
challenge is that the proxy may process and can potentially address some of the 
issues with the social ID, such as ensuring uniqueness and adding ‘soft’ qualifies 
around reasonable association with a community or name form, making it meet 
sufficient criteria to satisfy the AARC-Assam profile. 
Since it depends at least in part on the implementation of the proxy, its expression must 
therefore not only be via a profile but it also needs to be accompanied by an implementation 
specification or identifiable policy or technical controls. 
These guidelines extend the REFEDS RAF profiles by adding specific profiles that – 
although not easily feasible for adoption by the IdPs of the R&E community at large - are 
currently established for Infrastructure risk profiles, and that can be composed by 
augmenting assurance data from sources available to the Infrastructures (since additional 
information on origin or on policy-enforced  authentication strength) and are thus effective in 
addressing inter-Infrastructure use cases. 
  
Guideline on the exchange of specific assurance 
information between Infrastructures (AARC-G021) 
 
Published 2018-02-13 (Final) 5 
AARC-G021 





The following profiles may be conveyed as entity assurance values within the scope of this 
Guideline, subject to the guidance given below. The “MUST”, “SHOULD”, and “MAY” entries 
indicate the value of the assurance attribute that are to be asserted. 
5.1. REFEDS RAF Profiles 
Name REFEDS RAF Assurance Profile Cappuccino 




Description has a unique identifier, identity proofing and credential qualifies 
substantially to Kantara LoA 2, IGTF BIRCH or CEDAR, or eIDAS low, 
and can be attained with single-factor authentication according to 
REFEDS SFA without further constraints. Affiliation information is not 
older than one month. 
MUST https://refeds.org/assurance/profile/cappuccino 
 









Name REFEDS RAF Assurance Profile Espresso 




Description has a unique identifier, identity proofing and credential qualifies 
substantially to Kantara LoA 3 or eIDAS substantial, and must be 
attained with multi-factor authentication according to REFEDS MFA, 
where the multi-factor credential cannot be derived solely from a 
single-factor. Affiliation information is not older than one month. 
MUST https://refeds.org/assurance/profile/espresso 
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5.2. Supplementary IGTF profiles for Infrastructures 
 
Name IGTF BIRCH 





Description Persistent non-reassigned identifier, identity proofing based on in-
person appearance (current or past), remote vetting with 
compensatory controls, or Kantara LoA 2 or better. Includes a 
reasonable verified representation of the real name of the entity, and is 
secure with a best common practice (27-bit entropy as per NIST 
SP800-63v2, 2004) single factor or multi-factor authenticator. Identity 
and authenticator are managed by the CSP. 
MUST https://igtf.net/ap/authn-assurance/birch 
SHOULD https://refeds.org/assurance/ID/unique 
 the unique identifier should be specified in compliance with 




 note: one cannot in all cases assert MFA here, since using two 
factors where one is (even with compensatory controls)derived 
from the other factor is not compliant with MFA, but permissible 
under the BIRCH profile provided specific compensatory 
controls are in place. 
https://refeds.org/assurance/ATP/ePA-1m 
MAY urn:oid:1.2.840.113612.5.2.3.1.2.1 (1SCP IGTF file-protected soft 
keys)  
urn:oid:1.2.840.113612.5.4.1.1.1.5 (IGTF PKP Guidelines) 
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Name IGTF DOGWOOD 





Description Persistent non-reassigned identifier, identity proofing sufficient to 
ensure non-reassignment of the identifier for the lifetime of the CSP. 
May contain marginally-verified real name resemblance or identifiers 
clearly identifiable as pseudonyms. No anonymous credentials 
permitted and issuance is traceable at time of issuance. Authenticator 
is secured according to best common practice (27-bit entropy as per 
NIST SP800-63v2, 2004) single factor or multi-factor authenticator, or 
compensatory controls on credential validity period are in place. 
Identity and authenticator are managed by the CSP. 
MUST https://igtf.net/ap/authn-assurance/dogwood 
SHOULD https://refeds.org/assurance/ID/unique 
 the unique identifier should be specified in compliance with 




MAY urn:oid:1.2.840.113612.5.2.3.1.2.1 (1SCP IGTF file-protected soft 
keys)  
urn:oid:1.2.840.113612.5.4.1.1.1.5 (IGTF PKP Guidelines) 
5.3. Supplementary specific profiles for Infrastructures 
Name AARC Assam 




Description Identity substantially derived from social media or self-signup identity 
providers (outside the R&E community) on which no further policy 
controls or qualities are placed. Identity proofing and authenticator are 
substantially derived from upstream CSPs that are not under the 
control of the Infrastructure. The Infrastructure ensures uniqueness on 
the identifiers based on proprietary heuristics. 
MUST https://aarc-project.eu/policy/authn-assurance/assam 
SHOULD https://refeds.org/assurance/ID/unique 
 only provided the Infrastructure Proxy can comply with the 
requirements on this unique identifier as specified in the 
REFEDS RAF [RAF], including the single natural person and 
traceability requirements therein; 
the unique identifier should be specified in compliance with 
AARC-G026 “Uniquely identifying users across infrastructures” 
https://refeds.org/assurance/IAP/low  
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5.4. Attribute freshness assurance component 
The semantics of eduPerson(Scoped)Affiliation changes for the Infrastructure Proxy .The 
ATP assurance component (attribute freshness) [ATP] SHALL reflect the affiliation of the 
identity with the Infrastructure (in compliance with guideline AARC-G025 “Exchange of 
affiliation information” [AARC-G025]) and not with the upstream identity provider. Since such 
Infrastructure affiliation may be based on several sources of upstream identity in case of 
account linking or when the account is composed based on information from multiple 
sources, the ATP freshness component value of the source attributes SHOULD NOT be 
simply copied to the freshness of the resulting attributes. It MAY reflect the freshness of 
source attributes for deriving attributes related to the infrastructure (information on the 
freshness of source attributes could be used in the logic of the Proxy in determining 
freshness).This behaviour also ensures that information communicated to service providers 
will be consistently related to the identifiers communicated by the Infrastructure Proxy as per 
the AARC-G026 “Uniquely identifying users across infrastructures” [AARC-G026] guidelines. 
Meaning attached to the values of eduPerson(Scoped)Affiliation SHOULD comply with 
guideline AARC-G025 “Exchange of affiliation information”. 
5.5. Implementation notes 
All statements should be asserted in a SAML rendering in eduPersonAssurance. The 
authenticator contexts MFA and SFA values should also be presented in SAML in 
AuthenticationContextClassRef. See the REFEDS Assurance Framework for discussion. 
If the authentication assurance component meets the REFEDS-MFA criteria and the 
Infrastructure Proxy can determine that at least one of the factors also meets the minimum 
requirements for REFEDS-SFA, but in order to assert a specific assurance profile REFEDS-
SFA or another authentication that relies on a single factor is required, then the REFEDS-
MFA authentication assurance MUST be interpreted to also satisfy this single factor 
authentication when determining the assurance profile value, but at the same time the 
assurance component value for authentication SHOULD continue to be expressed as 
REFEDS-MFA. 
The ATP assurance component values (e.g. “https://refeds.org/assurance/ATP/ePA-1m”) 
should be interpreted as meaning that the Infrastructure Proxy that composes assurance 
and that processes the sources of information (external identity providers, community 
registries) will take action to correct a status change within one month after they became 
aware of the changes in the user’s status with the Infrastructure. The assurance originating 
at an Infrastructure Proxy will signify freshness within the originating Infrastructure according 
to its policies. Communities, but also institutions with long-term student enrolment typically 
re-evaluate eligibility only on a yearly basis or when changes of status are actively 
communicated to them. 
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AARCGL AARC Guidelines Series, https://aarc-project.eu/guidelines/ 
AARC-G025 Exchange of affiliation information 
https://aarc-project.eu/guidelines/aarc-g025/ 
AARC-G026 Uniquely identifying users across infrastructures 
https://aarc-project.eu/guidelines/aarc-g026/ 
AARC-G031 Account linking & LoA elevation in cross-sector AAIs,  
https://aarc-project.eu/guidelines/aarc-g031/ 
ATP The ‘freshness of the (eduPersonScopedAffiliation) attribute value’ assurance 
aspect as per the REFEDS RAF assurance framework [RAF]. 
BPA AARC Blueprint Architecture (AARC-G012),  
http://aarc-project.eu/blueprint-architecture/ 
CSP Credential Service Provider, as used in the REFEDS Assurance Framework 
[RAF]: “A trusted actor that issues and/or manages credentials. In the context 
of this specification, CSP refers to the Identity Provider and the associated 
Identity Management system that manages the user identities, attributes and 
authentication observed by the Relying Parties.” 
IAP Identity vetting assurance aspect as per the REFEDS RAF assurance 
framework [RAF].  
IGTF https://igtf.net/ap/loa 
MFA REFEDS Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) Profile 
https://refeds.org/profile/mfa 
PROXY Infrastructure Proxy as defined in the AARC Blueprint Architecture (AARC-
G012), http://aarc-project.eu/blueprint-architecture/ 
RAF https://wiki.refeds.org/display/GROUPS/Assurance+Working+Group 
SFA REFEDS Single-Factor Authentication (SFA) Profile (draft) 
https://refeds.org/profile/sfa;  
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1HOcM2o4N7Ly9elRd5OQH2dCmfjY83
WBv7ZCPgFysNmE/ 
 
 
